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Metaphysics and the “natural attitude”
The task of  metaphysics in the tradition inherited from
Descartes was to sort out and systematize the fundamental structures
of  our knowledge, and thus of  our access to truth. Since Descartes
took “I think, therefore I am” as his starting point, the “subject” (the
knower) came to be identified as that which is conscious (“I think”),
and it has been understood as separate and immaterial, observing its
“objects” from outside and above. This was a vindication of  the
individual thinker, not unconnected with the Protestant Reformation
which set in motion a transformation of  the moral and religious climate,
as well as being an integral part of  the whole intellectual ferment out
of  which the experimental sciences were born. But in due course this
understanding of the thinking subject as isolated, cut off from
interaction with what it contemplates, began to push philosophy
(especially in what has come to be known as the “Continental” tradition)
to recognize its shortcomings, if  not its fundamental incoherence.1
Thus we begin to move from what philosophers have identified as
“modern philosophy” into “postmodernism.”
Husserl’s phenomenology begins by inheriting this creaking
tradition as the project of  a subject not so far removed from its Cartesian
predecessor. He thought that Descartes started in the right direction,
but did not go far enough.2 Indeed, the breakthrough of
phenomenology may be described as the outcome of  taking subjectivity
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more seriously than it was by Descartes, who took the subject’s status
for granted, and moved straight to what concerned him more, the
“objects” of  thought. This is what Husserl and his successors dubbed
the “natural attitude.” Of  it, Merleau-Ponty wrote:
It is natural to believe ourselves in the presence of  a world
and time over which our thought soars, capable of
considering each part at will without modifying the part’s
objective nature. Science, at the outset, takes up and
systematizes this belief, which always takes for granted an
absolute observer in whom all points of  view can be
summed up, and correlatively an accurate blueprint
(géométral) of  all perspectives.3
No human being can claim actually to be the “absolute observer” with
insight into such a blueprint, but it is just this account of  what knowledge
should be that has come into question. Heidegger, schooled in
Husserlian phenomenology, called it “onto-theology”, implying as it
does that what we seek is a “God’s eye view” (a view from everywhere
and nowhere) and that what is true, what can be known of  what is
“real” (“what is”) could be laid out before such an all encompassing
consciousness. This is the metaphysics that Heidegger would have us
move beyond: the “ontological” is not something to be considered
from the outside, but something that challenges us, calls us to account
from inside, as we shall have occasion to discuss further below.
The appeal of  the “natural attitude” – what makes it seem
natural, after all – is that we are normally unaware as we focus on the
objects before us of  what we ourselves bring to the situation. According
to Merleau-Ponty, as we have seen, it is the attitude originally adopted
by science, which thus tends to leave out of  account what is actually
contributed from the side of  the scientists, their relationships with
fellow human beings, and their situation in the world we all share. The
goal of  “objectivity” is apparently that of  rising above the human
condition altogether. “Rising above” brings us back to Merleau-Ponty’s
image of  “soaring”, and in several other places he refers to la pensée de
survol (“high altitude thinking”) – and one of  the issues of  particular
concern for the present essay is the implication of  this distance. For
the detachment thus aspired to, the legacy of  the “I think” as separate
and immaterial as I described it above, means not only that ideally one
would have no effect on what one observes, but also one is oneself  cut
off  from being affected in the present. Such a consciousness can have
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no sense of  a relationship with that of  which it is conscious. (Eventually
philosophers who go down this path are confronted with the paradox
of  solipsism – and if  this is where they stop, philosophically speaking,
they have come to a dead end.4)
Husserl’s phenomenology was developed in response to this
impasse in the relationship of  the knower to what is known. My take
on phenomenology, largely following Merleau-Ponty’s existential
interpretation, gives me a sense of  being brought back to earth (Husserl’s
“to the things themselves!” – zu den Sachen selbst!), an escape from that
high-flown metaphysics. For Husserl’s move was to turn away from a
focus on the object to reflect on our experience of  it, bracketing, for
the time being at least, the conundrum of  internal versus external data
(the issue of  solipsism.) This experience now becomes “evidence” –
the given – and what one goes through in the present (Erlebnis) takes
precedence over a theoretical perspective, over the “I think” of  the
tradition. In order to attend to this new data, we must adopt a new
attitude, abstaining from the attitude that comes most “naturally.” This
technique of  epoche, or bracketing of  concern with the “objective,”
makes possible the “reduction” which brings into view the subjective
correlate which has always been there, the aspect of  consciousness
always already taken-for-granted. What makes phenomenology
especially confusing is that it has somehow to convey a sense of
consciousness as itself  something to reflect on, and so break the spell
of  the natural attitude. This reflection, the attitude of  attending to the
evidence of  one’s own experience (rather than that which is publicly
shared and labeled), is not a theoretical approach, and it cannot be
justified by a theory: it is a matter of  side-stepping theory and, as far as
possible, encountering what is given “as is,” without what Husserl came
to call “the garb of  ideas.”5
The difficulty I encounter when I begin to explain
phenomenology to students is that what I am really trying to get across
is a particular experience which is not amenable to conceptualization,
and which, as I shall argue, is inherently open-ended. It is true that the
early Husserl apparently believed that the method of  phenomenology
would enable us eventually to set aside all presuppositions, and in
principle the Transcendental Ego once attained would overcome the
limitations of  individual perspectives, and we would thus still be on the
path to “universal truth”, the old vision of  metaphysics. But this
aspiration did not distort his evaluation of  what experience offered as
evidence, with the result that his commitment to “the things themselves”
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kept him from the temptation to la pensée de survol. He did not, in Merleau-
Ponty’s phrase, try to reduce the true to the likely (le vrai au vraisemblable,
le réel au probable).6 Thus, what he originally thought of  as the ego-pole
of  intentionality gave way to an understanding of  passive synthesis,
that is, of  meanings we find ourselves already participating in, not
attributed to an isolated constituting consciousness. When Merleau-
Ponty said that the most important thing that the reduction teaches us
is the impossibility of  a complete reduction,7 he was among other things
alluding to the way Husserl had to keep starting over in his
phenomenological investigations. For one must always be prepared
for the recognition – and the recurring possibility – of  it turning out
that “I only thought I knew, but now…,” which puts what had so far
been concluded into question. There are always further horizons.
(Almost every book Husserl published, year after year, was called an
“Introduction,” or the equivalent, and he referred to his work as always
beginning again.) But what becomes relevant for the case I wish to
make in this essay is that by the time he wrote the material included in
Experience and Judgment (edited and published posthumously) he could
say that the foundational experience (our first consciousness) is of  a
“Thou,” the second person, with whom I am already in relationship,
leaving the third person, the “doxic,” the knowledge of  objects, to
come later.8
Phenomenology as “Metaphysical” and the Ethical
Heidegger, who has been identified as the first existential
phenomenologist and was a major influence on the French movement,
describes the metaphysical question as the question that puts the
questioner in question.9 As Dasein is the entity for which “Being is an
issue”, the outstanding example (the “ontological” question) is that
posed by the real possibility of  “not-being,” i.e., the end of  all of  one’s
possibilities in the face of  the insurmountable reality of  one’s own
death.10 This certainly disrupts the natural attitude, and for him and
Sartre, as for Kierkegaard, it is this kind of  disorientation, frequently
experienced as anguish, which breaks through one’s taken-for-granted
assumptions about what one is, one’s existence, and so confronts one
with one’s ineluctable subjectivity. For these thinkers, though in different
ways, subjectivity is revealed in an experience of  isolation, of  freedom
as forlornness, and in relation to action, having to make decisions
without the possibility of  reassurance that one is on the right track.
This existential turn introduces an ethical dimension to the
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phenomenological tradition, but perhaps does little more than mark
the space left by rejection of  the older (modernist) versions of  ethics.
The analogue of  the natural attitude in this domain is that of  assuming
that there are (or ought to be) ready-made answers to questions about
what we ought to do, that it is possible to know what is right. These
answers have generally come either as a version of  theology or as a set
of  principles, whether in the form of  duties, as for Kant, or rules by
which to evaluate consequences, as in utilitarianism. Without this kind
of  blueprint of  what we ought to be and do, without “objective”
standards of  value, for Sartre we are “condemned to be free,”11 and
“Man is a useless passion.”12 There would seem to be no promise of
ethical insight from this version of  metaphysics, no resource or guidance
for handling our moral dilemmas.
How then can Merleau-Ponty write of  la conscience métaphysique
et morale? The answer lies in the way Merleau-Ponty takes up the
existential application of  phenomenology. While for Heidegger and
Sartre, subjectivity is isolated (“in each case mine”, as Heidegger puts
it), Merleau-Ponty is closer to Husserl, especially with respect to the
point made above, namely that we are always already in relationship
with other people. For ethics, at a minimum, has been about human
beings coping with living together, and the rules and principles
mentioned above are meant to address the problems that have always
arisen in human societies. Even when there seemed to be universally
acknowledged standards and/or criteria, judging by them and/or living
up to them was never a cut and dried procedure: the lived situation
always presented problems. The practical continually confounded the
theoretical. The move away from the natural attitude which is the
achievement of  phenomenology is, for Merleau-Ponty, a move towards
a clearer sense of  what is inherent in the relations between subjectivities,
as well as the possibilities of  shared knowledge and value: “Metaphysics
begins from the moment when, ceasing to live in the evidence of  the
object . . . we apperceive the radical subjectivity of  all our experience as
inseparable from its truth value [valeur de vérité]” (SNS 93). For, where
Heidegger and Sartre believed there could be no valid (authentic)
relationship between “subjectivity” and “truth”, Merleau-Ponty saw it
differently: “Metaphysics is not a construction of  concepts by which
we try to make our paradoxes less noticeable, but is the experience we
have of  these paradoxes in all situations of  personal and collective
history and the actions which, by assuming them, transform them into
reason”(SNS 95-96). This is a métaphysique en acte (SNS 95) and this
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“reason” is not a pre-existing logos or an impersonal perspective which
is to take account of  all relevant (possible) knowledge; rather, it is a call,
one might say, to ask participants in a discussion to be “reasonable,” to
be prepared to take risks, to cope with ambiguity, to learn from mistakes
and from another, perhaps radically different, point of  view. The truth
which is tied to subjectivity, then, is not an objective truth (as in the
“evidence of  the object”) which somehow belongs to no-one in
particular and is outside time; rather, it is a task before us: we are to
work together to accomplish the “becoming” of  truth. Subjectivity
then comes into the world as a way towards this truth, this value which
we are to bring into being together.
Thus, the experience of  subjectivity for Merleau-Ponty is not
that of  dread and isolation, and though it makes one aware of  one’s
irreducible “me-ness,” it grows out of  the relationships into which we
are born, and to which we continue to belong. We begin, he shows
(through studies of  child psychology as well as his own sense of  what
is going on) by participating in what one might call a “proto-subjectivity.”
Merleau-Ponty describes a vie à plusieurs (“undifferentiated group life”,
or “life lived by several”13) in which the small child is not yet aware of
itself  as “I.” At the other extreme from Husserl’s Transcendental Ego
which would transcend all points of  view,14 this is the context out of
which subjectivity (a point of  view) can emerge: Heidegger’s Mitsein,
perhaps, but not yet intersubjectivity.15 For that, I must be aware of  “I”
as not “you,” perhaps the first inkling of  the reduction, and then in,
due course, further experiences of  the need for a new orientation beckon
us towards an expanding intersubjectivity, the possibility of  an open
community which will take account of  as many points of  view as
possible. So as Merleau-Ponty envisages it, the effort of  philosophy is
to “push beyond all limits the becoming of  truth, which supposes and
brings it about that there is one single history and one world.”16 This is
in no way guaranteed, however. It is not even an intelligible blueprint,
because this approach does not sacrifice the means to the end.17
In recovering the significance of  human relationships, Merleau-
Ponty offers us a sense of  the inseparability of  the ethical and the
epistemological, so that phenomenology is seen as bringing about a
moral awakening (conscience), as well as letting the world we live in begin
to make sense in new ways. This is why I have used Merleau-Ponty’s
phrase, la conscience métaphysique et morale, without attempting to translate
it into English, that is, make a choice between “consciousness” and
“conscience.” If, as Merleau-Ponty is telling us, the awakening to
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metaphysical (phenomenological) consciousness is also at the same
time moral consciousness, it may not be that the French word is
ambiguous. Perhaps rather there is a distortion (even a systemic bad
faith) in the usual distinction that English speakers make between the
ethical and the epistemological, the moral and the cognitive. At any
rate the phenomenological reduction, like deconstruction,18 is not so
much something one does as it is something one undergoes, and for
that reason both Husserl (CES 228) and Simone de Beauvoir describes
it as a species of  conversion,19 as it is through the consciousness of
another consciousness that we come to recognize that we have a point
of  view, and that there is more to be discovered than what we can see
from our side. The awareness that the perspective of  another person
differs from mine is not just an example of  the way our supposed
“objectivity” might be called in question; it is what allows us to become
“subjects” that can appreciate that there are “objects” in the first place.
It is therefore the very germ of  rationality, of  the possibility of
discovering the real. For example, in perception, what makes the object
I can see real is that it has another side which is visible to another
person. In the Phenomenology of  Perception, Merleau-Ponty describes how
perspectives blend, perceptions confirm one another and a meaning
emerges (PP xix) and the way “the paths of  my various experiences
intersect, and [...] my own and other peoples’ engage like gears” (PP
xx). Acknowledging that this is another person, another awareness,
what both Simone de Beauvoir and Merleau- Ponty call another
freedom, means that we are already in the domain of  the ethical. (The
reason Merleau-Ponty resists the term “ethical other” is that as soon as
there is an other for me, the situation is constituted as ethical (PrP 307.)
There is no non-ethical other: to assume that there could be is already
to betray the other, to refuse an existing relationship – in a word, to be
“unethical”20). That is why Merelau-Ponty understands the
consciousness that allows itself  to be open to question as la conscience
métaphysique et morale – not two kinds of  consciousness, but one. He
tells us that this awareness “dies upon contact with the absolute, because,
beyond the dull world of  habitual or dormant consciousness [conscience],
this consciousness [conscience] is itself  the living connection between
myself  and me and myself  and others [autrui]”(SNS 95).
I suggest that la conscience métaphysique is the “living connection
between myself  and me” and is experienced in what Merleau-Ponty
called “paradoxes,” while la conscience morale is that which emerges in
conflict with others. “[W]hatever solidity there is in my belief  in the
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absolute is nothing but my experience of  a harmony (accord) with myself
and with others. Recourse to an absolute foundation – when it is not
useless – destroys the very thing it is supposed to support” (SNS 95).
And in the case of  the ethical, as I have suggested, moral
absolutes fail to help. Rather, as he says elsewhere “If  we are to rediscover
a morality [une morale21], we must find it through the conflicts that we
meet in the experience of immorality” (SNS 4, translation modified).
It is when things go wrong between us that we wonder about what we
should be doing – so the real questions arise in a situation where we
have to deal with the conflicts as best we may, within the horizons
open to us. Ethical judgements from outside, which Merleau-Ponty
would regard as pensée de survol, however naturally they present themselves
to us, never touch the experience as it is lived: “Everything happens on
the level of  life because life is metaphysical” (SNS 44) and man’s “bare
fortuitous existence is itself  the absolute value” (SNS 44). Moreover,
our existence finds us, as I have been insisting, always already in
relationship: “I” and “Thou” come into being together. “Our freedom
waits for the recognition of  other people and needs them to become
what it is” (SNS 45).
Metaphysics and Literature: Simone de Beauvoir
Simone de Beauvoir’s close association with Sartre has
sometimes interfered with recognition of her philosophical distance
from him. The two philosophical books she published, Pyrrhus et Cinéas22
and The Ethics of  Ambiguity develop a version of  existentialism which
directly addresses the very issues that Sartre seems to avoid, namely the
meaning of  human life and the relationship between freedom and ethics.
When de Beauvoir said that she did not regard herself  as a philosopher,
this should not be taken, I think, as a modest self  put-down, but rather
as wanting to distance herself  from the traditional role of  a philosopher
who tries to escape the ambiguities of  lived existence and achieve what
Merleau-Ponty called “a perfect transcendence of  expression” (SNS
28). It is true that many of  Merleau-Ponty’s examples of  the
“metaphysical” (especially in his essay “The Metaphysical in Man”)
come from what he called “the sciences of man” – the human sciences
– which challenge what we think we know about ourselves, nevertheless
he is impressed by what can be learned from novels. He discusses
several nineteenth century authors and explains how, since the
emergence of  phenomenology and existentialism, “the tasks of
literature and philosophy can no longer be separated” (SNS 28). He
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himself  was accused of  writing something more on the lines of  a
novel, not philosophy, when he was defending The Phenomenology of
Perception23 and was particularly impressed by the metaphysical
significance of  de Beauvoir’s novel, L’Invitée (in English, She Came to
Stay).
In this section I will use some of  de Beauvoir’s philosophical
insights (as well as convergences between her ideas and Merleau-Ponty’s)
to reflect on a few of  her other works as well. She herself  came to
describe the first book, (Pyrrhus et Cinéas) as too dry and abstract, and
although I value it for laying out the clear path of  her early thought, I
too feel she was able to delve more deeply into the human condition in
that long, highly sophisticated, philosophical novel, l’Invitée.
In Ethics of  Ambiguity, de Beauvoir describes the
phenomenological/existential conversion in terms of  “refusing to set
up absolutes” (EA 14). Throughout that book she shows ways in which
we can fail (and by implication, avoid failure) to live together in authentic
ways. (Merleau-Ponty noted that many “existential” novels, not just
this one, were “immoral,” insofar as they treat “the conflicts we meet
in the experience of  immorality.”) But de Beauvoir also indicates what
it would take for us to live with our fellows without falling into the trap
of  that “dull and dormant conscience” described by Merleau-Ponty (which
she defines as “bad faith”24). She does not offer moral principles, but
ways to recognize the taste of  authenticity in how we relate to one
another. In Pyrrhus et Cinéas, concerning our capacity to act in the world,
she wrote, “respect for the freedom of  others is not an abstract rule –
it is the first condition of  the success of  my effort.”25 It does not
guarantee that success, of  course, but without that hope there is no
possibility of  even trying, so we must make the first gesture, make an
appeal. And I make that appeal, she says, to someone I have to regard
as my peer. The violence I do to others, that I may find I have to do in
situations of  conflict, is not wrong because of  the Ten Commandments
or the Categorical Imperative, but because “the man to whom I do
violence is not my peer, and I need human beings to be my peers” (PC
p 138; F: PC 362). She Came to Stay is an account of  such need – for the
recognition of  one’s peers – as well as of  a struggle which wavers
between success and failure, freedom and frustration. The quotation
from Hegel which she uses as an epigraph: “Each consciousness desires
the death of  the other” is not a conclusion about the human species,
nor does it refer to a fact about a particular situation, but instead evokes
a terrible sense of  what is at stake. If  life is a game that can be won or
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lost (EA 23), in some sense it cannot be won, not once and for all.
“The essential is not to lose – but one never wins – it is in the face of
uncertainty and risk that we have to take responsibility for our actions
[assumer nos actes]” (PC 139; F: PC 365).
In Merleau-Ponty’s words, “there is...no solution to human
problems” (SNS 40). She Came to Stay and others of  de Beauvoir’s
novels, as well as the play, les Bouches Inutiles, can take us again into that
intolerable situation where there are no ready-made answers. In her
own discussion of  novels which are true to existence, de Beauvoir
argues that the writer must be caught up in the situation of  the
protagonists, so that their problems and possibilities are alive enough
to push the author, too, to make discoveries.26 Only thus can the novel
hope to fulfill its proper task, which is to so involve its readers as to
appeal to their freedom.27 Thus she also has to struggle with the issues
as she writes...she isn’t the outside observer even in the fictional world
she is creating. There are then no solutions, none that is that can relieve
us of  the responsibility of  facing the risks, of  taking up the task that
being-in-the-world-with-others sets for us. And life is undeniably
ambiguous, good and evil are mixed. But this ambiguity, these dangers,
are not a reason for despair. While, as I remarked above, the epoche in its
existential version is frequently experienced as anguish, in this is not
the same as despair. De Beauvoir does not agree with Sartre that “Man
is a useless passion.” Rather usefulness or uselessness depend for their
meaning on what is being aimed at, and it is human desire, human
goals, that introduce value into the world (EA 11).
In her novel, All Men are Mortal, Fosca, who becomes immortal,
eventually despairs because there is no longer a real future for him,
towards which his desires can draw him. That is to say, there is no
blank page to challenge him, no moment of  choice like Kierkegaard’s
aut...aut..., which divides time into before and after. All meanings are
alike to him.28 Because he cannot lose, he cannot win. Like Orestes at
the beginning of  Sartre’s play The Flies, his actions carry no weight. He
is neither mystified, like the young Orestes, nor in bad faith (like de
Beauvoir’s adventurer turned tyrant, as described in Ethics of  Ambiguity),
but neither is he human. In the end, he has no peers whom he can be
with or against, so the power he once hoped to use for the good of  his
community comes to naught, since he cannot share its goals nor anyone
else his. And so one of  the points de Beauvoir is making in this novel
is that the means only matter in light of the end. It is appropriate that
the activity that holds Fosca’s interest a bit longer is experimenting in
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science. It seems as it did to the Seventeenth Century philosophers,
(and perhaps to scientists today) as if  one could seek knowledge for its
own sake, and this might give Fosca a reason to go on. But this too is
only a means, like the money that he has so much of, and it could only
have significance in relation to human ends – and without that, it is
pointless.
Although Fosca is not human, it may well be that he represents
the fulfillment of  what some human beings wish for – certainly when
Fosca chose his fate, he thought it was exactly what was needed at the
time. But such fulfillment, the novel tells us, does not bring the expected
satisfaction. I find myself  assuming that it is men who would identify
with Fosca, and in so identifying, in trying to escape the limitation of
mortality, would be confronted with the absurdity of  human activity
when seen from outside the human horizon. If  for Sartre and other
(male) existentialists human life is meaningless, perhaps it is because
men have felt more sustained by the absolute, whereas women have
not been able to buy the illusion of  being in the same way. Thus de
Beauvoir writes of  the joy of  disclosing being (EA 30), of  the richness
and freedom of  transcendence, of  leaving the fixed and identical behind.
For her, human reality (Heidegger’s Dasein) is not Sartre’s (unfulfillable)
“project to metamorphose its own For-itself  into an In-itself-For-itself ”
(BN 784).29 Her ambition is not futile, it is more open-ended, being
concerned with the humanly possible or what Merleau-Ponty calls the
“fecund.” The ambiguity she writes of  means there is more than one
meaning possible, conveying a sense of  the unfinished which offers an
opportunity, if  we can rise to it, for the implementation of  new meaning,
the enactment of  what Merleau-Ponty calls expression. Simone de
Beauvoir agrees with Merleau-Ponty in finding the situation of  the
(authentic) artist analogous to the moral dilemma. He is perhaps more
emphatic than she, though, when he writes:
In morality as in art there is no solution for one who
wants to be certain ahead of  time where he is going, and
confident at every moment he is in the right and absolute
master of  himself. We have no other recourse than the
spontaneous movement which binds us to others for weal
or woe, in selfishness or generosity. (SNS 9; F: SNS 4)
The “logic” of  expression is that of  parole originaire (originating
speech, speech as origin), which is the occasion of  the coming to be of
new meaning, exemplified in the first words of  a child, the declaration
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of  a lover, as well as the achievement of  the poet, artist or thinker,30
and also the capacity of  one who is able find a way to make sense of
what may have seemed an impossible situation. This speech, also called
parole parlante, is distinguished from parole parlée (secondaire), in which we
make use of  already established, second-hand meaning – symptomatic
of  that “dull world of  habitual or dormant consciousness/conscience”
referred to above. A creative response which breaks out of  that world
can introduce a new dimension, a way forward, opening up a future for
us all; although of  course, as Merleau-Ponty says, “It is like a step taken
in the fog, no-one can tell if it will lead anywhere” (SNS 3; F: SNS 8).
What I am claiming then is that the logic of  expression, that of  morality
and art in the quotation from Merleau-Ponty, can help us make sense
of  the search for truth. For, as we have seen, truth is not something
already fixed and immutable, available to an “absolute observer,” yet it
is not therefore an illusion, to be abandoned when we have to recognize
that what we “know” is relative to our situation. While there is no
“accurate blueprint of  all perspectives,” there is your perspective and
mine, and to the extent that they differ, and exactly to that extent, we
have a chance of learning more, of  widening our horizons. What matters
is our capacity to let our own perspective be put in question. This, if
anything is the practical (lived) meaning of  “objectivity,” the re-orienting
experience of  “I thought I knew,” which has been the blind spot of  so
much epistemology.
A Reflection on the work of  Luce Irigaray
To illustrate this theme I want now to turn to some insights I
have gleaned from reading Luce Irigaray. Upon first encountering her
work, some years ago now, I experienced a dislocation, an inward
shudder (yes, a reduction), because I realized that her attempt to
appropriate philosophy – to read Plato and all the others as a woman –
jolted me into an awareness that I had not let myself  think that way
before. And I knew myself  to be implicated, me a woman, effectively
put in question, mise en cause, so that the significance of  femaleness in
relation to philosophy became an inescapable question – for me,
certainly, if  not for philosophy, for our time, as Irigaray suggests in the
opening words of  Ethics of  Sexual Difference.31 I realized I had taken the
philosophical tradition as parole parlée, and it was not truly mine; she
helped me see how much I was stuck in assumptions that did not sit
right with my experience. In particular, my reading of  Merleau-Ponty
was transformed by her example as much as by what she herself  wrote
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about him.32 Thus I came to recognize that his sense of  corporeal
intersubjectivity and la chair (flesh) may be too generic (i.e., taken-for-
granted masculine), but it can be corrected and enhanced by Irigaray’s
works in the phenomenology of  women’s embodiment.33 Different
perspectives mean different contributions to making sense of  our shared
world, and a new understanding of  the possibilities of  male/female
intersubjectivity. Since then I have been acutely aware of  my
responsibility to find my voice as a woman thinker. And it is here,
especially, that the ethical and the epistemological are indistinguishable.
The question why men should listen to women, or why women should
learn to speak from their own experience cannot be classified as one to
the exclusion of  the other.
The relation between language and the lived body described
in such a wealth of  detail by Merleau-Ponty takes on a new significance
as one comes to realize the differences between the sexes. And the way
the masculine take on the world has taken precedence has meant that
in many ways women’s experience, women’s meanings have been seen
as deviant if  not denied altogether, both by men and women. Hence
the importance that Irigaray attaches to the need for parler femme, the
articulation of  speech by women from women’s experience, which is
not distorted by trying to make it congruent with men’s. One of  the
reasons then, that I feel called to try to do philosophy without being
de-sexed is that it has become important to me to figure out how my
being different from a man can be a resource for reaching for a truth,
achieving a rationality that would not otherwise be possible. The
struggles, the conflicts I discussed earlier in the paper take on a new
poignancy in the light of  woman’s contesting of  man’s hegemony. De
Beauvoir’s account of  language as appeal seems peculiarly feminine to
me.34 But Merleau-Ponty writes about the way parole originaire can express
a vérité de demain, a “truth of  tomorrow,” which speaks without saying
and “which touches the springs of  hope and anger in everyone.”35
And this depends on each of  us witnessing as fearlessly as we can to
what is revealed in our differing perspectives, and handling the conflict
in such a way as to move forward. As Merleau-Ponty says of  Sartre’s
No Exit, “If  other people are our instruments of  torture, it is first and
foremost because they are instruments of  our salvation. We are so
intermingled with them that we must make what order we can out of
the chaos” (SNS 41). As de Beauvoir illustrates so well, intersubjectivity
is fragile – which is what Merleau-Ponty says of  reason. (The point
being made here is that they are effectively the same thing.) But even in
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the midst of  bitter conflict, “My consciousness of  another as an enemy
comprises my affirmation of  him as an equal” (SNS 68), which is why
there is hope as well as pain in the raised consciousness of  the oppressed
group, and it holds a promise for us all. For we are part of, or are called
to be part of, “a real humanity which creates itself  through work and
through praxis rather than seeking to define itself once and for all”
(SNS 85). So let us, male and female, rich and poor, black and white,
etc., etc., “Push beyond all limits the becoming of  truth, which supposes
and bring it about that there is one single history and one world.”
Central Connecticut State University
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